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Babies and Bosses: An Examination of Section 41 of the 
Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 
aJ Pheroze Jagose * 
Domestic and international considerations rel~evant to the Parental Leave and Employm~ent 
Protection Act 1987 (her~eafter the PLEP Act 1987 or the 1987 Act) justify and require the 
strict interpretation of the central provisions of that legislation. Section 41 of the 1987 Act, 
if it is to be interpreted so as to ensure its intended ~effect requires a four-step process to 
be successfully negotiated by an employer before the section's presumption, establishing 
the parent's right to return to work after parental leave, may be rebutted. The legislation 
does not anticipate a balancing of competing workplace interests but holds the worker's 
interest to be superior to that of his or her employer. Such a statutory imbalance explicitly 
recognises a worker's independent interest in his or her employn}ent. 
Introduction 
Every mother is a working mother, but women as workers and as mothers have a long 
history of struggle in maintaining their rights in their productive and reproductive roles in 
society. Since the 1960s demographic and economic trends - demonstrating that the 
economic perfonnance of women in the economy is substantial - have induced many 
countries, including New Zealand, to reorient social policies which reflect more clearly the 
needs of working women. Towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, when the first laws to "'protect" working women - mainly focusing on 
maternity - were introduced in various industrial countries, the number of working women 
outside the household was very low. Since that time, however, the participation of wom~en 
in the workforce has grown at an extraordinary rate. 
With that increased participation hav~e grown substantial bodies of domestic and 
international legislation, policy and practice seeking to combat discrimination against 
women in the workforce. One of the most subversive forms of discrimination has been that 
against working mothers - discrimination based often on inherited and outmoded social 
customs, beliefs and values. Yet working mothers, as much as ever, need financial support 
and job security during all stages of reproduction - during pregnancy, confinement, nursing 
and childrearing. 
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Since 1981 New Zealand has had legislation wbicth 
some protection against that discrimination wbieh 
women from the labour market for perforaning 
economy and society. The Maternity Leave and 
after the MLEP Act 1980 or the 1980 Act), by s. ~ 
that women taking maternity leave would have their 
from that leave. A similar rebuttable presumption is now to be 
Act 19871 which repealed and replaced the 1980 Act MlCI 
and employment protection to both parents. 
Despite the length of time they had formed part of 
provisions of the 1980 and 1987 Acts establishing tile 
during periods of maternity or parental leave had ROt 
until the Manukau City Counci/2 and Onehunga Bol'tJUglt 
Labour Court in the late 1980s. These two decisiou 
protection provisions of the 1987 Act confer substantial rilbts 011 
to their employment at the end of their parental leave.• TbiiJ 
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The 1987 Act provides for unpaid maternity, paternity and leave ef 
to be shared between the parents (where those parents have each 
for at least I 0 hours a week for the 12 months prior to the 
natural or adopted child - of up to 52 weeks in total and protecls the jeba af 
are on such leave. The Act also provides a complex set of 
application for parental leave and on the giving of notice of 
leave - see Yock & Co v Northern Clerical, fiiiiMif/. 
the Act provides a complaints procedure for challenain& variOAe 
Act. The Act prohibits dismissals on the grounds of tr 
interim order for reinstatement of workers allegedly so 
can continue work until their complaint is dealt with tlui8&fl tle 
v Hogg Cook Holmes Cardiff Ltd A 14/88 (minute, 
1988). Where an award or agreement provides at least 
individual worker as the Act, the award or as•wata 
Officers' IUW v ANZ Banking Group (New Zea/11111/) 
Ltd v Northern Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant etc 1UW [1 
[1988] NZILR 747. The complainant held the posftloll 
City Secretary's Department and was seconded 
The position had a maximum salary of$36,000 p.& ... 
management" and was found by the Court to be a 
[ 1989] I NZILR 476 (also ALC 89/88, ...... 
J. 17 August 1988). The complainant held tbe 
Public Library . 
The Onehunga Borough Council \VII talr• 
Protection Act 1980 while the MQIIuknl 0, 
Parental Leave and Employment Act 
aspects of both Acts are substantially slmillr 
parents, both decisions are immediately ~ 
1987 Act. 
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at I.,. is, arguably, the most important part of the 1987 Act - the employment protection provision 
• in the light of those two decisions. 
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41. Presumption that employee's position can be kept open in the case of other 
periods of parental leave - (1) Wher.e an .employee takes a period of parental leave 
(other than a period referred to in section 40 of this Act) the employer shall be 
presumed in any proceedings under this Act, to be able to keep open for the 
employee, until the end of the employee 's parental leave, the employee's position in 
the employment of the employer unless the employer proves that the employee's 
position cannot be kept open -
(a) Because a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable due 
to the key position occupied within the employer's enterprise by the 
employee; or 
(b) Because of the occurrence of a redundancy situation. 
(2) In determining li'hether or not a position is a key position for the 
purposes of subsection (l)(a) of this section, regard may be had, among other 
things, to -
(a) The size of the employer's enterprise; and 
The training period or skills required in the job. (b) 
(3) The reference in subsection (1) of this section to the e.mp/oyee 's 
position in the employment of the employer shall be a reference to the position 
ordinarily held by the employee, and shall not include any position to which the 
employee was temporarily transferred under section 16 of this Act. 
The PLEP 1987 at s.41 .. thus creates a presumption - in favour of a parent's right to return 
from parental leave to the position slhe held on taking that leave - rebuttable only (a) when 
the position held is made redundant;5 or (b) when the position held is a "key position" -
and even though the position is a key position - a temporary replacement to take the place 
of the parent for the duration of that leave is "not reasonably practicable due to the key 
position occupied". 
s Redundancy is not defined in the PLEP Act 1987 Act. Redundancy was defined in the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 and the definition was carried over in s.l76(5) of the Employment Contacts Act 
1991. In Auclcland Provincial District Local Authorities' Officers' JUW v Wailcato District Council 
[ 1990] 3 NZILR 871, Travis J considered at page 881 that a "redundancy situation'' in the 1987 Act 
could: 
". . . cover a situation where jobs are or will disappear because of a superfluity or excess 
of manpower, as distinct from circumstances in which the employment of an individual 
employee is terminated by reason of that individual being surplus to the requirements of the 
employer . . . We therefore consider that the words "redundancy situation" can be 
construed as a reference to both a position becoming superfluous to an employer's needs, 
as well as the worker no longer being required." 
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The central thesis of this article is that s.41 of the 1987 Act requires a four-step process to 
be successfully negotiated by an employer before the presumption, establishing the parent's 
right to return to \vork after parental leave, is rebutted. Firstly, it is necessary for the 
e1nployer to establish that the parent occupies a key position in the employer's enterprise. 
However, that of itself, will not be sufficient to disestablish a parent's right to return to 
\Vork. Secondly, there must be present the further factor that a temporary replacement to 
take that parent's place would not be reasonably practicable. Thirdly, that temporary 
replacement must be not reasonably practicable because of some intrinsic quality of the key 
position which n1akes such temporary replacement "not reasonably practicable". And 
fourthly, that the test of "reasonable practicability" meets the legal definition of that term. 
In all other circumstances save that of redundancy - quite irrespective of the difficulties or 
operational inefficiencies experienced by the employer - the employer is obliged to keep 
the parent's position open for his or her return. 
It is therefore apparent, even from this cursory interpretation of s.41 of the 1987 Act, that 
for the section to be given its intended effect and to meet its intended purpose, a strict 
interpretation is both warranted and required. This strict interpretation of the section is 
readily justified by a number of don1estic and international considerations surrounding the 
introduction of the 1980 and 1987 Acts. 
Policy considerations 
The PLEP Act I 98 7 is an act to prescribe minimum ,entitlements with respect to parental 
leave for all \Vorkers and to protect the right of workers during both pregnancy and parental 
leave. That description of the Act comes from its long title and is important insofar as it 
denotes the double thrust of the legislation - towards both the provision of the leave and 
the protection of the parent's ,employment. It is, of course, the second aim of the legislation 
\Vhich is arguably the n1ore important since the provision of leave without any right to 
return to \Vork \Vould effectively be the legislative provision of a right to dismiss pregnant 
\Vorkers and their partners. 6 
The double thrust of the legislation was also clearly understood by Parliament during the 
House's debate of the 1987 Act's progenitor, the Maternity Leave and Employment 
Protection Bill. The second reading of that Bill7 \vas moved by the Hono, rable David 
Thon1pson - the Acting Minister of Labour - who stated that: 
7 
111 is connection between the right to :return to work after parental leave and the prohibition of 
dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or parental leave is so close that in England, for example, the 
parental leave and employment protection provis.ions are contained in that country's Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 - the same legislation as establishes the industrial law concept 
of "unjustified dismissal" as contrasted to the common law's "wrongful dismissal". For a 
\Vide-ranging consideration of parental leave and employment protection internationally see 
"Protection of Working Mothers: An ILO Global Survey ( 1964-1984)", Women At Work 2184 (ILO, 
Geneva, 1984 ). 
[ 1980] NZPD 5510. 
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The objective of the Bill is to prescribe minimum requirements in respect of maternity leave 
and protection from dismissal by reason of pregnancy for all women. 
• • • 
The philosophy underpinning the Bill is based on the conviction that \VOrking women should 
be able to start a fan1ily without having to leav,e en1ployment permanently or have their 
. 8 
employment record severely disrupted. 
Similarly, the Honourable Aussie Malcolm, the member for Eden" summed up the reasons 
for which the Government had found it necessary to introduce the Bill. He stated that: 
We would not have to do it if society were perfect, because what the Bill contains is self-
evident. Howev,er, because there is still such a deep prejudice in our society against women, 
particularly child-bearing women, it is necessary for us to legislate a minimum standard -
a minimum standard that I hope will be exceeded in practice in many instances. 
We are saying that, regrettably, prejudice against women, and particularly against child 
bearing women, is so deeply ingrained in society that w,e are obliged to pass this small, 
con1plex Bill, with all its restrictions on people, to oblige employers to provide certain rights 
to pregnant \Vomen. 9 
By the enactment of the 1987 Act, Parliament extended the protection of the MLEP Act 
1980 to both parents. Nevertheless, the purpose behind the introduction of the 1980 Act 
remains pertinent to every \Voman seeking to take parental leave and have her job kept open 
for her return from that leave. The policies, in opposition to the discrimination against 
women and, in particular, pregnant women in the workforce, and the position of working 
women seeking parental leave present a social purpose aspect to the interpretation of s.41 
of the 1987 Act. That social purpose is to ensure that women's participation in and 
opportunities in the workforce are not limited by pregnancy or childbirth, insofar as 
women's pursuance of their maternity and parental needs interrupt their career progression 
or foreclose their career choices. 
In very broad terms, Williamson J made extensive and generalised obiter comments on the 
social purpose behind the introduction of the MLEP Act 1980 in Ne1v Zealand Bank 
Officers' JUW v ANZ Banking Group (Ne""' Zealand) Ltd10• He stated that: 
I 
10 
Over at least the last I 00 years, there has been a definite trend to\vards improving the legal 
status of women and their ev~eryday conditions of life. Broadly speaking, it is a trend 
towards social justice. The right to vote, to hold separate property, to equal pay for ~equal 
work, and the various other rights to be free from discrimination, are all matters of social 
justice. Maternity leave provisions must be viewed against that background. Those 
provisions are aimed at giving a female employee the right of choke to continue her 
employment career after an interruption for purposes of childbirth, early nurturing and to 
make arrangements for suitable continuing care of the child. Social justice is not achieved 
without cost or without changes to the existing order. An improved position for one person 
Ibid, 5510-5511. 
Ibid, 5519. 
[ 1983] ACJ 803. 
136 Pheroze Jagose 
nonnally means some detriment to others bJ 
the change. 
0 0 0 
Present maternity leave provisions mean t~ 
social justice of a right of choice to condmle 
situation pertaining before the change some -* 
completing maternity leave resumes her 
positions lose one chance of promotion and, a*-
to commence employment with that emplo,w wJJ 
delineation of maternity leave rights a 
acceptable to meet this newly recognised ..,MC8IioD fit 
of an employee completing maternity leave II nat aa 
against the employer's right to manage the btlslne 
female employee's right is governed by co 
business; and by the amount of cost to the , 
other employees. The award provisions, and the prov1aJau 
these conflicting rights and interests.11 
It is clear that these statements are not necessar) 
application of the 1987 Act. In the Manukau City 
[The] Court is bound in our view to reject a submL.im 
Court must balance the rights which the employ. Ills. 
flowing smoothly, with the rights given to the If)' 
are intended to outweigh the rights of the empley•. • 13 
and, indeed, Williamson J' s own comm.enta 
commentator as "the bitter pill of social justice. 
changing status and recognition of women in the 
when regard is had to the policy underlying tbc • 
Working women and childbirth 
The purpose of the 1987 Act is also largely 1lNullrl 
properly to be taken into account in any in 
Honourable David Thompson: 
I I 
12 
ll 
14 
IS 
The philosophy underpinning the Bill is based 
be able to start a family without having 
employment record seriously disrupted. 15 
Ibid, 813-814. 
Supra, n 2. 
Ibid, 750. 
Broadsheet, December 1983, 19. 
Supra, n 8. 
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A compilation of demographic data regarding working women and childbirth
16 
prepared 
by the Working Women's Resource Centre discloses substantial statistical validation for 
effective parental leave legislation. It is apparent from that compilation that an increasing 
number of women are entering the workforce. 17 Most women have entered the labour 
market by the ages of 18 to 19. 18 At the same time, childbearing is occurring later in 
women, s lives. The average age of women at the birth of their first child has risen from 
23.7 years in 1964 to 26 years in 1985. 19 Most births now occur when the mother is 
between 25 to 29 years old.20 Therefore, women spend more time in the workforce 
before giving birth (between six and eleven years) and hav~e more time to develop an 
established career path. 
At the same time, women are having few~er children21 and are completing childbearing at 
an earlier age - 75 percent of women born in 1910 completed their childbearing by the age 
of 34 while 75 percent of women born in 1945 completed their childbearing by the time 
they wer~e 28 years old. 22 According to one survey completed by Susan Shipley, the 
majority of women return to the workforce before their youngest child is one year old.23 
• 
These statistics evidence the need to consider the career disruption which occurs with 
pregnancy and childbirth. This interruption frequently causes women to lose their jobs. 
Typically, on re-entering the workforce, these women must start at lower positions with 
lower pay. They lose the seniority necessary for promotion and for the establishment of 
job security during periods when the economy falters. The resuh of this discontinuity is 
that women's careers are perceived as being less valuable than men's. By eliminating the 
stereotype that the mother should give up her paid employment simply because she is the 
childbearer, maternity leave, coupled with the right to return to the mother's job, has the 
potential to interrupt this cycle. 24 
16 
17 
II 
19 
20 
2 I 
22 
21 
24 
Woodley, Compilation of Demographic Data Regarding JVorking ~Vomen and Childbirth, Working 
Women's Resource Centre, 1'988. 
Department of Statistics, New Zealand Population Census I 981 and I 986, ·wellington. Since 1981, 
the percentage of women in paid employment has increased by 1 0-12 percent. 
Ibid. 15 percent of women have entered the workforce by the time they are 18 or 19 years old. 
Department of Statistics, Vital Statistics, Wellington, 1986. 
Ibid. There is a significant and corresponding dip in the representation of this age-group of women 
in the workforce. 
Department of Statistics, Demographic Trends, Wellington, 1987. The fertility rate decreased from 
4.19 children in 1962 to 1.93 children in 1985. 
Ibid. 
Ship~ey, W~men 's Emp/oyme~t and Unemployment, 1982. The survey was in Palmerston North only 
- a caty whach has a substantaally better than average number of childcare facilities. 
See Cicori~ "Pregnancy and Equality: A Precarious Alliance" ( 1987) 60 S Cal LR 1345. 
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Women's participation and opportunities in 
and opportunities are not limited by pregnanf)f 
strictly interpreted so that the purpose of its 
by which such limitation can be prevented 
International recognition of the right 
The limitation which can occur to women's 
workforce by pregnancy and childbirth is also 
New Zealand's international legal obligations as 
protection are such as require a strict interpretariea 
ensure an interpretation consistent with those 
Such reliance on New Zealand's international legal 
Gorkom v Attorney-Genera/ and Others2s - a GIBI 
expenses by the Education Department for traast.ad 
cost of all their household's removal expenses 
personal expenses met - an argument was raised 
(under the authority of sub-delegated Ie 
discrimination and the Supreme Court's attention 
legal obligations in the area of combatting d.· .. "' 
that: 
Reference to certain international documents, tboup IH1t 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and 
Assembly of the United Nations as a common SIIDdalll 
2 and 23(2) statements that everyone is entitled to all die 
without distinction of any kind ... 
Obviously these very general statements are .. 
questions as removal expenses. Nor are they p1111 ef 
goals towards which members of the United N 
to certain social rights enunciated in the Un 
Rights, the opinion is expressed in 8 Halsbury., 
They may be regarded however as ... ft, 
might influence the courts in the in 
Cooke J, again, when similarly confronted i 
international legal obligations in Ashby v 
dissenting judgment of Scarman LJ in Ahmad "' 
the learned Lord Justice had this to say: 
2S 
26 
27 
21 
[ 1977] I NZLR 535. 
Ibid, 542-543. 
[1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
[ 1978] QB 36. 
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Today, therefore, "''e have to construe and apply section 30 [of the Education Act 1944 
(UK)] not against the background of the la\v and society of 1944 but in a multi-racial 
society which has accepted international obligations and enact,ed statutes designed to 
eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, colour or sex. Further, it is no 
longer possible to argue that because the international treaty obligations of the United 
Kingdom do not become law unless enacted by Parliament our courts pay no regard to our 
international obligations. They pay very serious regard to them: in particular they will 
interpret statutory language and apply common law principles, wherever possible, so as to 
r,each a conclusion consistent with our inte.rnational obligations." 29 
Richardson J, also in Ashby v A1inister of lmmigration 30, similarly cited the above passage 
of Scarman LJ, saying that: 
It has been increasingly recognised in recent years that, ,even though treaty obi igations not 
implemented by J,egislation ar·e not part of our domestic law, the Courts in inte.rpreting 
legislation will do their best confonnably ·with the subject matter and the policy of the 
legislation to see that their decisions are ,consistent with our international obligations.3' 
And all thre·e judges in Ashb;?2 cited, with approval, the judgment of Diplock LJ in 
Salomon v Con1missioners of Customs and Excise33 where he stated: 
Once the Government has legislated, the court must in the first instance construe the 
legislation, for that is what the court has to apply. If the tenns of the legislation are clear 
and unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or not they carry out Her Majesty's 
treaty obi igations. But if the tenns of the legislation are not clear but are reasonably capable 
of more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes relevant, for there is a prima facie 
presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law ... 
One must not presume that Parliament intends to break an international convention merely 
because it does not say expressly that it is intending to observe it.34 
It is therefore appar~ent that any interpretation of the 1987 Act ought be consistent with New 
Zealand's international obligations as regards the subject matt,er of the Act. If anything, 
need to have regard for such consistency has increased rather than diminished with the 
passage of time. Cooke J in Tavita v Minister of Jmmigration35 , present~ed with an 
argument that int,ernational instruments could be ignored, stated: 
29 Ibid, 48. 
)0 Supra, n.27. 
)I Ibid, 229. 
l2 Supra, n.27. 
)) [1967] 2 QB 116. 
)4 Ibid, 143. 
Unreported, CA 266/93, 17 December 1993. 
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That is an unattractive argument, apparently iiiiPIYIII 
international instruments has been at least pattly 
be hesitation about accepting it. The law as te the 
human rights and instruments declaring them is 
[was drawn] to the Balliol Statement of 1992, the f\111 
with its reference to the duty of the judicialry to 
ordinary legislation and the common law in dte lilltt 411 
• • • 
A failure to give practical effect to international 
party may attract criticism. Legitimate criticism could IX11Ild 18 t1ao 
if they were to accept the argument that, because a 
international human rights nonns or obligations ... (they 
New Zealand's international legal obligations as rea-cts 
maternity leave are not insubstantial. There is a 
International Labour Organisation covenants. 
that parental leave and employment protection bo 
responsibilities. 
New Zealand has been a member state of the U · 
of that body in I 948. New Zealand voted in favour of 
rights, the Universal Declaration of Human _·_ =--
member states affit 111 "their faith in the equal rii)Jts Gf 
and small". The principles of the Universal 
transforn1ed by the United Nations into a number --
establish legal obligations on each ratifying state. 
between a member state and the United Nations and 
state to its citizens. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social aad 
unanimously by the General Assembly of the 
came into operation on 3 March 1976 after the 
ratified it. New Zealand ratified the Coven* 
to its ratification relevant to the issue of 
The Government of New Zealand reserves 
circumstances foreseeable at the present time. tile 
relates to paid maternity leave with adequate 
Article 1 0( 1) and (2) of the Covenant states: 
36 
The state parties to the present covenant recc 
I . The widest possible protecti• 
to the family, which is the 
society, particularly for · 
Ibid, pp.l4-16. 
responsible for the care 
Marriage must be entered 
intending spouses. 
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2. Special protection should be ac~corded to mothers during a reasonable 
period before and after childbirth. During such period \Vorking mothers 
should be accorded paid leave with adequate social security benefits. 
The final text of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women was approved by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in December 1979. New Zealand ratified the Convention in December 1984. The 
Preamble of that Convention states: 
Bearing in mind the gr,eat contribution of women to the we'lfare of the family and to the 
dev~elopment of society, so far not fully recognised, the social significance of maternity and 
the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the 
role of women in procr~eation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing 
of children requires a sharing of responsibility between m~en and \vomen and society as a 
whole. 
Article 11 (2)(a) and (b) states: 
In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity 
and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures: 
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the 
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity l ~eave and discrimination in 
dismissals on the basis of marital status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits 
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances ... " 
By its ratification of these covenants, New Zealand has accepted the specific obligations 
under them. This includes making such changes in legislation and practice as are necessary 
to fulfil those obligations. The PLEP Act 1987 was enacted after New Zealand had ratified 
both the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against Women, 
and hence it is required to receive an interpretation not inconsistent with New Zealand's 
obligations under those documents. The later ratification of the "Women's Convention", 
in particular, has strengthened and endorsed the implication that a denial of parental leave 
for women (including the prevention of reinstatement after the period of parental leave) is 
a form of discrimination against women based on their sex. As a measure ~combatting such 
discrimination, the 1987 Act again requires an interpretation which achieves or furthers 
New Zealand's international legal obligations. 
There have also been a substantial number of ILO Conventions and Recommendations 
regarding maternity and parental leave and employment protection which have come into 
force since 1921. By way of summary, those documents establish, as a right, maternity 
leave and the provision of job security for the duration of that leave. As Article 8( 1) of the 
Declaration of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Women Workers, adopted at the 
1975 International Labour Conference, states: 
There shall be no discrimination against women workers on the grounds of pregnancy and 
childbirth and women bearing a child shall be protected from dismissal during the entire 
period of pregnancy and maternity leave. They shall have the right to resume their 
employment without loss of acquired rights. 
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: ~ ~ ': .. '' When New Zealand's international legal obligatioas tG 
rights are compared with the provisions of the 1987 A-. · 
nothing but the strictest and most narrow interpretatiOR ef &.41 
Employment Protection Act 1987 will achieve an · 
Zealand's international legal obligations. 
Section 41 of the PLEP Act 1987 
This article began by giving a brief and strict interpretation of 
interpretation which is warranted and required by both policy 
article has continued to expand on those policy and lelll 
necessary to tum to a more in-depth analysis of s.41 of the 
In broad tenns, s.41 establishes a presumption of a parent's 
taking parental leave. To rebut that presumption, an emplar-
things: 
(a) Firstly, the employer will have to prove tlul&. 
position" within the employer's · If 
the worker will be entitled to return to llis or 
of parental leave. 
(b) Even if the employer can prove that the 
employer will, secondly, have to further 
for the parent while on parental leave is 
ordinary meaning of that phrase. That, ..... 
disentitle the parent from returning to hiS of 
(c) Thirdly, the employer will additionally 
replacement is not reasonably practica~ 
that phrase, "due to the key position 
enterprise" by the parent. 
(d) Finally, even if the employer can ft'P.ft~ 
that a temporary replacement is not 
practicable by reason of the key 
to further show that the plea to 
replacement due to the key 
definition of the phrase " ""~·-... 
It therefore becomes necessary to define the ...... _ 
replacement being not reasonably practicable". 
For the purposes ofs.4l(l)(a) ofthe PLEP Act 
a crucial and pivotal nature to the efficient 
required to be filled on a pettnanent basis. 
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~his definition is obtained from a careful analysis of Williamson J' s obiter comments, in 
he ANZ Bank case37, where he stated: 
To say \vhat is a key position, regard must be had to s.l6(2)(a) and (b) and "other things". 
Looking broadly at Parliament's purpose, and the attainment of its objects, we think the 
pr,esumption was intended to be irrebuttabl,e in cases where persons with elementary skills 
were employed in large ,enterprises and hence did not occupy key positions. We think 
Parliament intended the test (of temporary replacement being not reasonably practicable) to 
be applied: 
(i) In small enterprises wher,e a person with elementary skills might be said 
to occupy a key position in that enterprise and might have to be replaced 
on a permanent basis~ and 
(ii) In all enterprises, including larger enterprises \vhere only a fairly well 
trained or skiHed person might be said to occupy a key position and might 
have to be replaced on a permanent basis." 
(Underlining the author's .) 
Simply because a person possesses vast skills and has undergone enormous periods of 
training will not be sufficient to say that the position held is a key position. Similarly, the 
size of the employer's enterprise is not decisive of any position within that enterprise being 
a key position. Those factors of skills and training required in the job (stressing the phrase 
"required in the job") and the size of the employer's enterprise need to be taken into 
consideration when deciding whether a position is a key position. But it is still necessary 
to decide for what purpose regard is to be had to those factors. According to Williamson 
J, the purpose for having regard to those factors is to see whether or not the position held 
needs to be "filled on a pennanent basis" - permanent, that is, as opposed to temporary. 
This seems to be a correct interpretation of the phrase "key position" - that it is a position 
of such a crucial and pivotal natur~e to the efficient operation of the employer's enterprise 
that it is required to be filled on a permanent basis. It seems correct for two reasons: 
(a) The first step of denying a parent his or her right to return to work after 
parental leave ought only be able to be taken in circumstances of extreme 
and established need by the employer - after aU, the entire thrust of the 1987 
Act, when considered in its domestic and international context, is to 
guarantee parents' job security and unimpaired career progression on their 
return from parental leave. 
(b) The only reason which will operate so as to destroy that entitlement is that 
a temporary replacement for the parent on parental leave is not reasonably 
practicable. It is necessary, in the scheme of the Act, to reach a position 
where an employer needs to be able to deny a parent his or her right to 
return and that need will only be acceptably demonstrated by the employer 
showing that the position held by the parent is required to be filled on a 
penuanent basis - pennanent, as was stated before, as opposed to temporary. 
Even where an employer can show the position is required to be filled on a pettnanent 
basis, the 1987 Act expects of such an employer still greater flexibility in meeting the right 
)7 Supra, n 10, 822. 
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of a parent to return to his or her position at the end of 
the employer to further accept that, even though the 
perntanent basis, a temporary replacement will suftiee 
leave. It is only when the employer can show Ia a 
reasonably practicable - and not reasonably practicable clue 
position held - that the employer will be able to 
position open for his or her return. 
It is considered that such a strict interpretation is justiied. 
and legally and in New Zealand and internationally • CJf 
and, in particular, of mothers to parental leave and 
discussed and justified elsewhere in this article. The ~ 
open for socially acceptable reasons or while they fulfil 
new. Sick leave, annual leave, bereavement leave, 
"compo", sabbatical leave, study leave, family leave, aad 
places in various industrial documents and establish 
the leave to have their job kept open for their retUI&. 
Employment Protection Act 1973 establish the absohda 81111 
to be granted leave of absence, to resume their 
dismissal for periods of "protected voluntary service or 
months of continuous leave. Similarly, in times of 
protected absolutely for their return from military serviae. 
have been established to ensure the country is 
emergency, there are some who would argue that tke 
in and opportunities in the workforce is rapidly u•• l ........ 
Thus the exception to the general presun1ption that a 
his or her return from parental leave ought be strictly 
definition to that which is contemplated by the ov..U 
That being so, it now becomes necessary to 
practicability" of a temporary replacemen.t. 
For the purposes of s.41(l)(a) of the PLBP t9ll 
replacement is reasonably practicable requires a 
of Parliament's objects in enacting the Act 8D.d 
those objects. 
Section SG) of the Acts Interpretation Ac1 
McCarthy J when delivering the 
• reqwres: 
. . . that in such circ1m 
such fair, large and liberal 
legislation accordin& to its aw 
11 [1973] 2 NZLR 211, 214. 
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Such an interpretation is clearly necessary of s.41 and of the 1987 Act as a whole. It is 
particularly relevant to the proper interpretation of the meaning of "reasonable 
practicability" because the definition of those words similarly require an understanding of 
the Act's true intent, meaning and spirit. When the words "reasonably practicable" are 
interpreted in a manner coherent with the direction given by s.S(j) of the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1924 that interpretation will be as strict as that otherwise urged by this article. 
In Porter v Bandridge 39, a decision of the English Court of Appeal - a case also cited and 
noted by Williamson J in the Af.lZ Bank case40, Ormrod LJ considered the different 
interpretations of the phrase "reasonably practicable". The facts involved the question of 
whether a complainant, who had failed to bring his complaint for unfair dismissal within 
the statutory time-limit, could establish that it was not reasonably practicable to bring the 
complaint within the time period. The case thus uses the phrase not in relation to a 
responsibility of an employer - as in the PLEP Act 1987 - but in r~elation to a time limit for 
starting proceedings by a worker. However, in the course of his judgn1ent., Ormrod LJ 
provided a useful sun1mary of the various judicial interpretations of the \vords "reasonably 
practicable" stating: 
The phrase is one which parliamentary draughtsmen find useful, in various contexts, to 
express the intention of Parliament that the provision which it qualifies is not to be applied 
with the inflexibility of a mechanical or automatic process, but with due regard to the 
constraints to which human beings are subject. These, of course, vary according to both 
circumstances and subject matter. In consequence the meaning given to the \Yords 
"reasonably practicable" varies with the context in which it is used. At one end of the 
spectrum are the cases relating to the statutory duties placed upon ~employers to take steps 
to protect their employees. There the phrase is strictly interpreted. Some distinction is 
recognised betv.'een "possible", "practkable" and "reasonably practicable", but the onus of 
proving that a precaution is not reasonably practicable is a heavy one. At the other end is 
s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which requires the Court exercise its po\vers so 
as to place the parties "so far as is practicable" in the financial position in which they would 
have been if the marriage had not broken down. In that context its meaning is equivalent 
in ordinary language to "practical" i.e. it is taken to mean that the Court should do the best 
it can in the circumstances to achieve the virtually unattainable goal set by the Act. "41 
It is therefore necessary to consider some of those cases which relate to the statutory duties 
placed upon employers to take steps to protect their workers. Typically, such cases involve 
the application of various health and safety legislation in the furtherance of which 
employers are required to take certain precautions "where reasonably practicable". Thus 
s.49 of the Coal Mines Act 1911 (UK) required mine-owners to make secure the roof and 
sides of every travelling road and working place unless such was not reasonably practicable. 
In Edwards v National Coal Boarcf2 Asquith LJ stated that: 
)9 [ 1978] ICR 943. 
Supra, n.l 0, 823. 
41 Supra, n 39, 951-952. 
42 (1949) KB 704. 
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The onus was OD tbe to 
case for them to have pJevtated a .._. flf 
term than "physicall)t possi\lle" aacl .... • • 
by the owner, in which the qtiiAtl'm of risk ie 
necessary for averting the risk (whether in 
and if it be shown that there is a gross 
insignificant in relation to the - the 
In the same case Tucker LJ stated that: 
It would, of course, always be relevant to allow tha 
particular place in tbe proposed IIHIIhad ..,. 
hold the view that cost must bo 
in the balance. In every it is the risk that lias ee 
necessary to eliminate the risk. The greater the risk, DO 
given to the factor of cost.44 
The concentration, in these two statements, on the 
risk to the workers that the Coal Mines Act 1911 was to 
was to ameliorate against the possibility of such 
the need to balance the furtherance of the le&islatioa 
in providing that which the legislation 
mischief which the Act is to p1event - the risk of iJVury 
to arise, the greater chance of success bas a 
impracticability. But when the Act's purpose is c11Jlrl7 
part of the mine-owner, only a very substantial claira 
those protections will be sufficient to obviate the 
This matter was developed further in Mtll'sltttll Y 
similar provisions in the Metalliferous Mines Act alit 
Lord Reid stated: 
4) 
I tum to consider what was meant by 
maintained for the appellant that this means ae 
to show that it was physically p1acticable to .. 
whether in the circumstances II bl9e 
there may well be precautions wbiall it ia 
take, and I think that follows from dw 
National Coal Board. I with wble "" 
was), and I do not find it helpfUl to coaaid. 
same as an employer's common law duty. 
practicable it must be taken iD the 
unreasonable. As men's lives may be • lllllll 
practicable precaution is unreasonable. 41 
Ibid, 712. 
44 Ibid, 110. 
45 (19S4] AC 360. 
46 Ibid, 372-373. 
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In the same case, Lord Keith of Avonholm stated that: 
It was no doubt a physical or engineering possibility for the mine owners in the present ~case 
to have carried out the precautions which were carried out after the accident. These might 
not have ensured absolute security. But 1 agree with my noble and learned friend, Lord 
Tucker, that if absolute security is not reasonably practicable that does not ex~cuse the 'mine 
owner from taking those reasonably practicable steps that will give a lesser degree of 
security. But it is not the precautions in themselves which have to be reasonably 
practicable. It is the observance of those pr~ecautions that is required so far as may be 
reasonably practicable.47 
Three points arise out of this case: 
(a) Firstly, a precaution which is practicable must be taken unl ~ess unreasonable. 
(b) Secondly, the more a precaution is likely to fulfil the purpose of the 
legislation which embodies it, the less likely will a court find the provision 
of that precaution to be not reasonably practicable. 
(c) Thirdly, it is not the purpose of the legislation which is required to be 
reasonably practicable to achieve, but the means of providing for the 
achiev~ement of that purpose. 
Therefore, using this analysis in a consideration of s.41 of the PLEP Act 1987, it first 
becomes apparent that the purpose of the legislation, aside from that policy discussed 
earlier, insofar as s.4l is concerned, is that of employment protection for parents while on 
parental leave. 
Secondly, the provision of a temporary replacement will absolutely achieve that purpose. 
The reasonable practicability of such provision of a temporary replacement imposes a very 
substantial onus on the employer. 
As to the third point of the analysis, the specific tenus of s.41 of the 1987 Act point to 
exactly what the legislation requires to be taken into consideration in assessing whether a 
temporary replacement is reasonably practicable. If s.41 of the Act stopped at the words 
''reasonably practicable", then an employer might be able to discharge the onus upon him 
or her by showing that, in all the circumstances, the means by which the employer might 
provide for the achievement of the purpose of the 1987 Act was not reasonably practicable -
- if, for example, the employer was able to show that, despite extensive attempts to find a 
temporary replacement, none were available. But, in the words of Williamson J in the ANZ 
Bank case48 , section 41 does not stop there. He states: 
47 
41 
49 
The presumption is not rebuttable on the sole ground that a temporary replacement is not 
reasonably practicable. There must be present the further element that such non-
practicability must be due to the key position occupied. 49 
Ibid, 377. 
Supra, n.l 0. 
Ibid. 822. 
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Of this statement, Finnigan J in the Manukau City Council cases0, stated, "That 
dictum is in our respectful view a correct statement of the law. "s1 His Honour ini'AI'"ft . . . 
the s.4l presumption and the circumstances of its rebuttal in strict tertns: 
The words of the statute in our opinion need to be approached with some care . . . It is 
readily appar·ent that the words "reasonably practicable" must be considered with the 
following words "due to the key position occupied" (emphasis supplied). While the 
proposition is accepted for present purposes that the worker's position was a "key position", 
it is necessary for the employer to establish that it was not reasonably practicable to put in 
a temporary replacement because of the key nature of the position. 
[Section 41] provides that if a question about the rights of a worker to parental leave comes 
before the Court the Court must presume in all situations that the employer has the ability 
to keep open the worker's position for the worker until the end of the period of leave. That 
is the obligation imposed upon the Court at the outset. It clearly gives the worker's rights 
predominance over those of the employer. In order to ease the effects of that requirement, 
the Act provides at s.41 (I) that it will not apply if "the employer proves that the employee's 
position cannot be kept open . . . because a temporary replacement is not reasonably 
practicable due to the key position occupied within the employer's enterprise by the 
employee". Obviously a crucial point is whether the position is a key position, but with that 
the employer must further establish that it is because of the nature of the position itself that 
a temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable. That narrows considerably the range 
of relief offered by the Act to employers. Further to that, the relief is not available "unless 
the employer proves . .. ", that is, until the employer proves the necessary facts. 
• • • 
In other words, it is our view that once the facts giving rise to a period of parental leave 
arise a worker is entitled to such leave and the employer must honour that entitlement if 
application is made irrespective of cost or inconvenience; this is the requirement of ss.41 (I) 
and 66(2) of the Act, and it remains so until . . . the employer has proved, i.e. has 
demonstrated or otherwise established, that the position is (i) a "key position" and that (ii) 
because of the nature of the position it is not reasonably practicable to entrust the duties of 
that position to a temporary replacement. 52 
By this authority, by the authority of Marshall v Gotham Co Ltt/3, and by the words 
s.41 of the Act themselves, employers must found their ability to discharge the onus 
them -to keep a parent's position open for his or her return from parental leave -on 
intrinsic quality of the key position itself which makes a temporary replacement 
reasonably practicable. It will not be sufficient simply for the employer to state or even 
prove that no temporary replacement could be found or that other staffmg 
made the temporary replacement impracticable. As Finnigan J continued to say in 
Manukau City Council case, "Difficulties encountered in finding a suitable 
replacement are not relevant unless [those difficulties] arise out of the nature of 
so Supra, n.2. 
:S I Ibid, 752. 
52 Ibid, 750-7 51. 
Supra, n.45 . 
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position. "54 There must be something about the nature of the key position itself which 
makes such temporary replacement "not reasonably practicable". 
To return to the decision of A1arshal/ v ~Gotham Co Ltcf5, it \vas held therein that the n1ore 
a precaution is likely to fulfil the purpose of the legislation which en1bodies it, the less 
likely is it that a Court will find the provision of that precaution to be not reasonably 
practicable. The provision of a temporary replacen1ent will absolutely achieve the purpose 
of s.41 of the PLEP Act 1987 by affording parents employment protection while on parental 
leave. There is an extraordinarily high onus of proof on the part of employers seeking to 
discharge that onus - .made even more stringent by the wording in the Act which requires 
that the onus be discharged only in relation to the non-practicability of a temporary 
replacement due to the key position held. 
However, ev·en if an employer can prove that the parent is in a key position, that a 
temporary replacement is not reasonably practicable and not reasonably practicable by 
reason of the key position occupied, the decision of the English ~Court of Appeal in 
Ed»'ards v National Coal Boarcf6 makes it clear that there is a further consideration which 
is required to be proved by the employer before being able to rebut the presumption that 
the worker's position will be able to be kept open for the worker's return from parental 
leave. That further consideration, which will decide the reasonable practicability, in the 
above circumstances, of k~eeping the worker's position open, involves "a computation" 
weighing up the worker's rights to return to his or her position at the end of parental leave 
against the employer's right to have the position occupied on a permanent - as opposed to 
temporary - basis. 
That computation will have to answer the questions: What is so crucial and pivotal about 
the position occupied by the worker that, by simply occupying that position, the worker has 
denied himself or herself any ability to return to the position at the completion of his or her 
parental leave? What is the interest of the employer in having that position occupied on 
s G a permanent basis - rather than on a temporary one - which is of such a weight that it 
outweighs the worker's statutory right to return to his or her work after completing parental 
leave? 
Conclusion 
Section 41 of the PLEP Act 1987 therefore r~equires that workers on parental leave have 
their positions kept open for their return from that leav,e in ~every circumstance, save that 
of redundancy, unless the employer can prove that (a) The position occupied by the worker 
is of such a crucial and pivotal nature to the effi,cient operation of the employer's ~enterprise 
that it is required to be filled on a pennanent basis; and, despite that requirement (b) A 
S4 Supra, n.2, 7. 
Supra, n.45. 
S6 Supra, n.42. 
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temporary replacement is nonetheless not 
that position; and (c) The claim of the 
outweighs the maintenance of the worker's 
of a period of parental leave. 
Social justice demands that employers, o 
sacrifice as is necessary to ensure that the 
and return to their positions at the end o 
particularly, the tern1s of the PLEP Act 1981 
and disruption presented by ensuring that 
Manukau City Council and Onehunga B 
more than lip service to the principles and i.a.at. 
decisions, clearly recognised and has been 
existing in the relationships between work 
The rights of the worker are intended to 
concept and effect of the Act is that in certain 
of right and that the employer must make 
the right is not infringed. 51 
At a time when employers are calling for laJlDIJ 
comply with their demands, the Labour --
be applauded in recognising that a different 
workers of their employers and in requiring 
employer is to bend to the needs of the 
S7 Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Jrd ed.) 
Sl Supra, n.2, 6. 
